The deceptive quiet of the Sahel: rising violence and political instability

The Sahel has effectively slipped from the front pages of global news. Over the last few years, the world’s geopolitical focus has shifted dramatically. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 pulled European attention eastward, while the 2023 escalation of the Israel-Palestine conflict dominated international discourse. Meanwhile, renewed rebel activity in the eastern République démocratique du Congo and the shifting political landscape in the United States have occupied the headlines. Yet, beneath this media silence, the deep-seated crises that have plagued the Sahel for over a decade are only intensifying.

Military leaders who seized power in recent coups across the region promised to crush jihadist insurgencies. That vow remains unfulfilled. Instead, extremist groups are expanding their reach, conducting brutal attacks against civilians in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—the three nations that formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in 2023. Today, the Sahel stands as the global epicenter of jihadist-related fatalities.

Parallel to the security failure is a sharp turn toward authoritarianism. Planned returns to constitutional order and democratic elections have been stalled, with transition periods repeatedly pushed back. Dissent is systematically crushed as press freedoms vanish. Both local and international journalists are being silenced or forced into exile, while civil society activists face arbitrary arrests, forced military conscription, or even extrajudicial killings.

This report examines the recent security and political shifts within the AES member states. It tracks the spread of extremist violence, assesses the current political climate, and argues for continued European Union engagement in the region, despite a shrinking Western influence. Monitoring these regional dynamics is vital to understanding the broader security implications for Africa and the world.

Persistent instability: the spread of jihadism and local strife

A decade ago, the Sahel recorded the lowest number of deaths from violent extremism on the African continent. By 2024, it became the deadliest. Fatalities have tripled since 2021, reaching 11,200 deaths. This surge in terror coincided with the wave of military takeovers between 2020 and 2023. Alarmingly, these figures do not include the 2,430 civilians killed in 2024 by national security forces and their Russia-linked partners. In some instances, state-aligned actors may be responsible for more civilian deaths than the insurgents themselves, leaving local populations in a state of extreme peril.

Mali: caught in a vice

Following the 2023 departure of the United Nations stabilization mission (MINUSMA), Mali saw a resurgence of conflict with Tuareg separatists in the north. Supported by Russia-backed troops, the Malian military is now fighting on two fronts: against separatist movements and jihadist groups, both of which the government labels as “terrorists.”

While the capture of Kidal in October 2023 was a symbolic victory for the junta, it did not secure the region. In July 2024, a strategic collaboration between the CSP-DPA (separatists) and the Al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM led to a massive defeat for Malian forces and Wagner mercenaries at Tinzaouaten. This ambush resulted in the deaths of approximately 40 Malian soldiers and 80 Russia-linked fighters, marking Wagner‘s heaviest loss in the region to date.

By late 2024, jihadists demonstrated increased tactical boldness. In September, JNIM launched simultaneous strikes on a gendarmerie school and the military airport in Bamako, killing over 70 security personnel and destroying the presidential aircraft. These high-profile attacks aimed to humiliate the regime and demonstrate the state’s inability to protect even the capital. Notably, the group focused on military targets to maintain a level of popular support, unlike the Islamic State in the Sahel, which relies primarily on governance through terror.

Civilians continue to pay a heavy price. In July 2024, a wedding in the Mopti region was attacked, leaving 40 dead. In August, retaliatory drone strikes by the Malian army killed over 20 civilians near the Algerian border. The bloodshed persisted into 2025, with over 50 people killed near Gao in February during a jihadist ambush on a military-escorted convoy. Despite this, 2024 surveys suggest many Malians still voice confidence in their armed forces’ “growing power.”

Burkina Faso: state retreat and the rise of militias

The security situation in Burkina Faso has spiraled since the 2022 coup. Reports indicate the state has lost control of roughly 60% of its territory, with JNIM operating in nearly every region. Fatalities jumped by 68% between 2022 and 2023, and 2024 likely exceeded those numbers. The most horrific massacre occurred in August 2024 in Barsalogho, where JNIM militants slaughtered between 130 and 600 civilians who had been forced by the army to dig defensive trenches.

State forces have also been implicated in atrocities. In early 2024, human rights monitors reported the summary execution of 223 villagers by the army in a single day. In March, civilian militias known as the VDP were accused of massacring Peul civilians—a group frequently targeted due to perceived ties to jihadists. In retaliation for these abuses, JNIM attacked a military camp in Diapaga, killing 30 soldiers and VDP members.

The Burkina Faso government has heavily militarized society by arming civilians. Captain Traoré expanded the VDP program, recruiting 50,000 additional members with minimal training. This strategy has fueled ethnic tensions, as certain communities, like the Peul, are largely excluded. Villages hosting VDP units have become primary targets for jihadist raids, blurring the lines between combatants and civilians. This cycle of violence has created a massive humanitarian crisis, with over 2 million internally displaced persons.

Niger: a rapid decline in safety

While Niger was once considered more stable than its neighbors, the situation has worsened since the 2023 coup. Security operations have intensified, but so has the lethality of attacks. Since the military takeover, state forces have reportedly killed three times as many civilians as in the previous year. Attacks against the military nearly doubled in 2024, and the number of active armed groups is on the rise.

Significant incidents include a March 2024 ambush in Tillabéri that killed 23 soldiers and a December attack near the Burkina Faso border that left 39 civilians dead. In March 2025, an Islamic State affiliate attacked a mosque, killing 44 worshippers. Despite the junta’s rhetoric, Niger is facing a steady erosion of security.

***

Though all three AES nations face a common jihadist threat, their strategies differ. Mali relies on Russia-backed troops for direct combat. Burkina Faso has focused on arming a massive civilian militia. Niger has used self-defense groups more sparingly. A shared trend, however, is the use of advanced tactics by insurgents, including drones, IEDs, and mortars. While jihadists largely control rural areas to collect “zakat” (taxes), recent rumors of “community dialogues” between Malian authorities and JNIM elements could signal a potential shift in strategy.

The era of permanent transitions

The military regimes in the Sahel have consistently moved the goalposts for returning to civilian rule, rewriting constitutions to entrench their power.

In Mali, elections originally set for 2022 were repeatedly postponed. Following a “national dialogue” in 2024, the transition was extended to 2029, allowing Colonel Goïta to remain in power and potentially run for office. Goïta further consolidated his authority by promoting himself to the rank of Army General in late 2024.

In Burkina Faso, Captain Traoré initially promised a 2024 election but later declared it was no longer a priority. In May 2024, he officially extended the transition for five more years. Similarly, in Niger, General Tchiani avoided setting an election date for 18 months before announcing a five-year transition in early 2025. Like Goïta, Tchiani promoted himself to Army General as he was sworn in for a five-year term.

These long-term mandates allow the juntas to solidify the AES confederation and distance themselves from the CEDEAO. With five years of guaranteed rule, these regimes are free to forge new international alliances, most notably with Russia, which recently pledged military support for the AES joint force.

Authoritarian control of the narrative

Unable to fully secure their borders, the AES regimes have instead secured the information space. Independent media has been dismantled, and foreign outlets like Radio France Internationale (RFI) and France 24 have been banned across all three countries. In Mali, even local private channels like Joliba TV News have had their licenses revoked.

In Burkina Faso, the crackdown has reached new heights. Outlets such as Jeune Afrique and TV5 Monde were suspended for critical reporting. By 2025, the regime began placing exiled opponents on “terrorist lists” and kidnapping journalists to force them into military service. In Niger, the junta has imprisoned journalists and detained former President Mohamed Bazoum without trial. The government has even begun seizing the passports of foreign visitors at the Niamey airport to monitor their movements.

By controlling the narrative, these regimes present a distorted reality. While the Burkina Faso government claims to control 70% of the country, independent researchers suggest that same percentage is actually under the influence of jihadist groups.

* *
*

The relative silence regarding the Sahel in Western media is a product of global fatigue and local repression. However, this silence does not equate to peace. All the drivers of the original crisis—jihadist expansion, food insecurity, and mass displacement—are worsening. By mid-2025, over 52 million people in West Africa are expected to face acute hunger. Displacement figures have hit record highs, with over 3.1 million people forced from their homes in Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, and Tchad.

The European Union must recognize that ignoring the Sahel will not prevent its crises from eventually impacting Europe. Disengaging from the region risks abandoning the populations who suffer most. As the EU reevaluates its strategy, it must decide how to navigate a landscape where military regimes are firmly entrenched and new global players are filling the void.