Spain’s foreign affairs landscape has been roiled by an unusually sharp accusation from Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares, who recently branded the conservative Partido Popular (PP) as an “anti-Morocco” force. This escalation goes beyond ordinary political sparring, as tensions over Morocco have become a central battleground in domestic disputes.
Albares argues that the PP is turning foreign policy—especially relations with Morocco—into a tool for internal political confrontation. Recent statements and controversies involving current and former PP leaders have intensified these claims, with the minister going so far as to call the opposition a direct “obstacle” to Spain’s diplomatic agenda.
Beneath the political rhetoric lies a deeper strategic reality: since 2022, Spain and Morocco have built a robust bilateral framework covering migration, trade, security, and policing. This partnership has only grown stronger, most recently in December 2025 with 14 new cooperation agreements and a joint declaration reinforcing political dialogue. Now, with the PP on the verge of potentially leading Spain, the future of this carefully constructed relationship hangs in the balance.
the western Sahara issue: a shadow over the pp’s credibility
The Western Sahara dispute remains the thorniest challenge for the PP. In March 2022, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez endorsed Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara as the “most serious, credible, and realistic” path forward. The PP, led at the time by Alberto Núñez Feijóo, condemned this shift, arguing it broke decades of bipartisan consensus on foreign policy and was made without consulting the opposition.
Yet the PP’s own record on Western Sahara is inconsistent. Under former Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, Spain maintained a cautious stance without outright opposition to Morocco’s proposal. Internal divisions within the PP have also been evident, with some members advocating a strong strategic relationship with Rabat while others aligned more closely with separatist positions.
The contradictions deepened in July 2025 when a purported Polisario representative attended the PP’s national congress, sparking controversy in Morocco and raising doubts about the party’s true stance if Feijóo were to assume power. The issue resurfaced dramatically in February 2026, when Albares accused the PP of operating with a double standard—publicly criticizing the autonomy plan while privately sending “emissaries” to Morocco to quietly endorse it.
If these claims hold weight, the PP faces a stark dilemma: leveraging Western Sahara as a political weapon from opposition benches is one thing, but reversing Spain’s current position once in government could carry severe diplomatic costs. The party has yet to provide a clear answer on whether a future Feijóo administration would uphold or abandon Madrid’s current stance.
a shifting international context
The PP would not take office under the same global conditions that existed when Sánchez announced Spain’s support for Morocco’s autonomy plan. Since then, the initiative has gained broader international backing, and the Western Sahara issue has evolved within the United Nations framework. Spain has also integrated its position into a much larger bilateral relationship with Morocco, one that extends beyond the dispute itself.
Reversing this stance would not be a simple matter of editing a diplomatic statement. It would reopen one of the most sensitive chapters in Spanish-Moroccan relations. The PP’s failure to clarify its intentions leaves a critical question unanswered: would a government under Feijóo maintain Spain’s current policy or revert to the pre-2022 doctrine? So far, the party has avoided giving a definitive response.
vox’s influence and the rise of nationalist rhetoric
Western Sahara is not the only source of friction in the PP’s relationship with Morocco. In recent months, the party has adopted a harder line on immigration and access to public benefits, competing with the far-right Vox party for nationalist votes. The debate over “national priority”—a concept historically tied to European far-right movements and aggressively promoted by Vox—has forced the PP to take a stance.
In April 2026, the notion of prioritizing Spanish nationals in welfare and public services gained traction in Spanish politics after being adopted in regional agreements. The PP has struggled to distance itself from the concept without alienating its base or appearing inconsistent. While some leaders, like Jaime de los Santos, have insisted that all legal immigrants have equal rights, others have softened the language with terms like “residential priority” or “anchoring.” Yet the damage may already be done—Vox has successfully pushed its agenda into the mainstream discourse of Spain’s largest right-wing party.feijóo’s paradox: opposition vs. governance
The PP’s central paradox is this: as an opposition force, it can attack the government over Morocco and Western Sahara. But if it gains power, it would inherit a relationship that is now deeply entrenched in Spain’s strategic interests. Cooperation with Morocco is not merely a political choice—it is dictated by geography, economics, security needs, and a growing web of shared interests. The most likely outcome is not a rupture but a contradiction: the PP may discover that many of the policies it has criticized are, in fact, essential to Spain’s national interests.
The accusation that the PP sent secret envoys to Morocco to quietly support the autonomy plan suggests that the party’s public rhetoric may not match its private pragmatism. If Feijóo becomes prime minister, he could face a difficult choice: either translate opposition rhetoric into policy and risk renewed tensions with Rabat, or acknowledge that the relationship with Morocco demands pragmatism—a stance the PP has not always embraced publicly.
The outcome of this internal conflict within the PP could define the first major foreign policy test for a potential Feijóo government. Regardless of who leads Spain, Morocco remains an indispensable partner, and the partnership forged since 2022 is now too deep and consequential to simply set aside.
You may also like
-
Rising insecurity in Mali after JNIM attack sparks security debate
-
DR Congo challenges global mineral governance at un, accuses Rwanda
-
Judicial appointments in Senegal stir debate over sonko’s 2029 exclusion plans
-
Benin’s bold move to revive culture and boost local economy through heritage restitution
-
DRC’s un address highlights Rwanda’s inaction over critical minerals and peace