When Niamey severed ties with Orano, the French group that had mined Niger’s uranium for more than fifty years, the move was presented as a historic reclaiming of national wealth. But beyond the political symbolism, a more concrete question demands an answer: what has this rupture actually delivered for the households, businesses and public coffers of one of the world’s poorest nations? The early signs suggest a mixed picture — greater bargaining leverage for the state, yet few tangible dividends for the population so far.
A sovereignty drive that has outpaced industrial reality
The split from Orano was never merely diplomatic. It reshaped an entire industry and its finances.
Orano lost operational control of its Nigerien assets in December 2024, and the Somaïr company — the long-standing operator of the Arlit mine — was nationalised on 19 June 2025. The French group, which had held 63.4% of Somaïr against the Nigerien state’s 36.6%, disputes the nationalisation and has launched multiple international arbitration proceedings.
The difficulty for Niamey is that taking over a mine does not automatically create a market for its output.
Nigerien production has fallen sharply over the past decade. Output dropped from 4,116 tonnes in 2015 to just 962 tonnes in 2024. Only one mine remains in operation, while several projects languish undeveloped. In effect, mining sovereignty has advanced faster than the country’s industrial and commercial capacity.
Why the ‘French price’ argument is misleading
A widespread assumption holds that Orano paid a below-market ‘French price’ while the rest of the world paid more. The comparison is deceptive.
Uranium does not trade like oil. There is no single exchange setting a daily price at which every producer sells. Contracts are negotiated directly between miners, intermediaries and nuclear utilities, often using formulas that blend spot indices with long-term prices.
Historical data nonetheless offers a useful benchmark. In 2020, the Nigerien state received roughly 48.1 billion CFA francs for 1,113 tonnes from Cominak, and 103.3 billion CFA francs for 1,879 tonnes from Somaïr. For Somaïr, that worked out to approximately €83.75 per kilogram of uranium, based on publicly available data at the time.
A separate analysis drawing on EITI figures estimated that uranium purchased by Orano sat around 45,000 CFA francs per kilogram in recent years — roughly $33 per pound — while some European or Japanese buyers reportedly paid closer to 60,000 CFA francs per kilogram.
The market has shifted dramatically since. In 2025, the average spot price paid by European utilities was $70.33 per pound, up from $53.59 in 2024. Multi-year contract prices, however, remained far lower at $54.70 per pound. By late September 2026, the spot indicator had climbed to around $89.63 per pound, with long-term prices reaching approximately $96.50 per pound.
The implication is significant: Niger now operates in a far more favourable pricing environment than in the early 2020s. Yet that does not prove Niamey is actually selling its uranium at $90 or $100 per pound. And that is where the picture clouds over.
The disputed Russian stockpile deal
The most striking case concerns the yellowcake stockpile accumulated at Arlit.
In 2025, several French sources claimed that Niamey had struck an agreement with Russia covering 1,000 tonnes of uranium concentrate for approximately $170 million. If confirmed, that would equate to about $170 per kilogram, or nearly $77 per pound.
That price would sit below the late-September 2026 spot price but remain comparable to certain contract levels seen on the international market.
The problem is that neither party has ever officially confirmed the arrangement. The Nigerien government denied selling the stockpile, and Rosatom stated it was not party to any such agreement.
Yet the affair is not merely rumour without material substance. In November 2025, roughly 1,000 tonnes of yellowcake were loaded onto trucks at Arlit. Around thirty vehicles then travelled to Niamey under military escort. The convoy ultimately found itself stranded at the capital’s airport.
This is precisely where the grey zone begins. A physical transfer of such magnitude does not by itself constitute proof of a sale. But it demonstrates that Nigerien authorities were actively working to commercialise the stockpile. The $170 million figure should therefore be presented as an allegation documented by multiple sources, not as an established contract.
Iran talks: confidential negotiations that left traces
The Russian file is not the first opaque episode.
In 2024, negotiations between Niamey and Tehran over 300 tonnes of yellowcake, valued at approximately $56 million, came to light. Several Western and Nigerien sources confirmed the existence of discussions.
The Nigerien government nevertheless denied concluding a sale. A government adviser acknowledged that Iran had sought to buy the 300 tonnes, explaining that Niamey refused due to a lack of available stock.
Once again, three distinct notions must be separated: negotiation, agreement and executed contract. The available information establishes that negotiations took place. It does not prove that a clandestine delivery occurred.
Russia and China: new allies or new customers?
Russia is today Niamey’s most visible geopolitical partner in the nuclear sector.
In December 2025, the Nigerien company Timersoi National Uranium Company signed a cooperation agreement with Uranium One Group, a subsidiary of Russia’s Rosatom, to explore deposits and eventually develop new mines.
China, too, has shown interest in the Arlit stockpiles. In 2025, sources indicated discussions potentially covering around 1,000 tonnes.
But these new partners do not necessarily guarantee better prices. What they primarily offer Niger is a broader set of negotiating options — a fundamental difference.
Is Niger actually selling its uranium on better terms?
At this stage, the most honest answer is: not yet proven.
Niger now holds three advantages it did not possess with the same intensity before. First, the international uranium price is far higher. Second, Niamey is diversifying its partners — Russia, China, but also Canadian, Australian and American players. Third, the government directly controls a key part of the mining chain.
But three weaknesses constrain this strategy: falling production, logistical problems and legal uncertainty stemming from the Orano dispute.
In September 2025, an ICSID arbitral tribunal ordered Niger not to sell or transfer to third parties the uranium produced by Somaïr that is subject to the litigation. Political sovereignty, in short, is not enough to create a solvent market.
The Nigerien paradox
Niger now wants to sell its uranium ‘at the best price’. But to achieve that, it must be able to produce regularly, transport its ore securely, attract capital and legally guarantee its contracts.
The country is precisely trying to rebuild that capacity. In 2026, it even created the Teloua Safeguarding Uranium Mining Company, intended to replace the nationalised Somaïr. Meanwhile, new Western investors are returning: in September 2026, the United States approved up to $414 million in financing for the Dasa project of Global Atomic, a Canadian company.
That may be the real turning point. Niger is not simply replacing France with Russia. It is gradually attempting to turn its uranium into a lever of competition between several powers.
For now, however, no public evidence allows the claim that new contracts deliver more to Niger than those signed under Orano. International price levels are higher, yes. Negotiating options are more numerous, yes. But the contracts actually signed, their pricing formulas, premiums, logistical costs and the net share returning to the state remain largely opaque.
As for ‘secret contracts’, there are confidential negotiations and accusations serious enough to warrant investigation, particularly around Iran and Russia. But to speak of definitively established secret deals would, to date, go beyond the available evidence.
The real stakes for Niamey are therefore no longer simply about whom to sell its uranium to. They are about at what price, with what guarantees, and above all what share of that value will actually remain in Niger.
