When fighters from the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Sahel (IS-S) clashed in the Tessit area along the Burkina Faso border on the morning of Friday, October 9, 2026, the immediate question was who won. The more consequential question, however, was what the fighting revealed about the ability of the region’s military governments to deliver the security they have promised.
Rival claims leave the outcome unclear but the danger unmistakable
Sources aligned with the JNIM said the rival organization suffered a heavy defeat on several fronts. Sources close to the IS-S, meanwhile, claimed victory over the JNIM and the capture of new territory.
These competing accounts do not, on their own, establish the true outcome of the fighting. What they do confirm is a troubling reality: armed groups are still battling each other for control of land across the Sahel, while civilians remain exposed to violence, forced displacement and the wider costs of a war that shows no sign of ending.
A contradiction the juntas can no longer avoid
The clashes lay bare a central contradiction in the security narrative of the military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, which together form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Since taking power, the military authorities have made the recovery of sovereignty and the fight against terrorism the cornerstones of their legitimacy. Yet the persistence of armed groups, their ability to move, organize and fight, raises hard questions about the effectiveness of the strategies being pursued.
The core problem is not simply the existence of terrorist groups. It is also the enduring difficulty states face in preventing those groups from putting down lasting roots on their own soil. Tessit illustrates this: while two organizations fight for position, local populations continue to bear the consequences of insecurity that refuses to fade despite repeated promises to restore order.
AES officials regularly denounce foreign interference, and depending on the circumstances, accuse certain neighboring countries of facilitating the activities of armed groups or serving as rear bases for their fighters. Such accusations must be weighed against verifiable evidence. The presence of terrorist groups on a country’s territory does not, by itself, prove that its leaders support or knowingly harbor them.
Still, one question is unavoidable: how can military governments justify their security record when armed groups continue to operate in areas where the state struggles to reassert lasting authority?
Sovereignty rhetoric versus conditions on the ground
One of the main challenges for the Sahel’s military regimes is now to show that their strategic choices are producing concrete results. Switching military partners, expelling Western forces and moving closer to Russia were all presented as ways to regain control of the security situation.
But such changes alone are not enough to eliminate armed groups. Persistent difficulties in Mali and the violence affecting various parts of the Sahel are a reminder that counterterrorism also depends on intelligence, an effective administrative presence, the protection of civilians and the ability of security forces to hold recaptured territory.
A United Nations report released in 2026 described continued activity by the JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel, particularly in the Tessit and Ménaka areas of Mali, as well as in parts of Niger and Burkina Faso. It also noted clashes between the two organizations over territorial control.
That reality undercuts narratives that present security failures as the sole product of outside maneuvering. Regional and cross-border factors are real, but they do not exempt any government from answering for its own results.
The political stakes of staying in power
Managing the terrorist threat also raises a broader political question: how to prevent persistent insecurity from becoming a permanent argument for concentrating power and postponing a return to normal constitutional order?
It would be reckless to assert, without evidence, that AES leaders knowingly harbor or nurture terrorist groups in order to stay in power. Such an accusation requires concrete, independent and verifiable elements.
It is legitimate, however, to examine the political consequences of a situation in which the security threat remains omnipresent while military authorities continue to present counterterrorism as a major justification for their rule.
The distinction matters: criticizing the possible political exploitation of insecurity is not the same as claiming that leaders themselves organize that insecurity. The first is political analysis; the second demands proof.
Citizens want results, not just explanations
In Tessit, the opposing claims by the JNIM and the Islamic State do not yet allow anyone to say with certainty which group prevailed in the October 9 fighting. But that uncertainty changes nothing about the central issue: both organizations remain capable of mounting operations and contesting control of certain areas.
For residents, the consequences are tangible. Insecurity disrupts travel, hampers economic activity and complicates access to essential services. Talk of sovereignty, international alliances and external enemies cannot indefinitely substitute for measurable results on the ground.
The governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger therefore face a simple demand: demonstrate their ability to protect populations, prevent armed groups from establishing a lasting presence and restore an effective public presence in affected areas.
Sovereignty is not measured only by the partners a government chooses or the foreign forces it sends home. It is also measured by a state’s capacity to protect its citizens on its own territory.
As long as armed groups continue to fight over territory in the Sahel, AES authorities will have to answer this question: beyond the rhetoric and the accusations aimed abroad, what lasting results can they show to guarantee the security of their people?
