In just over two months, Senegal’s head of state will hold an institutional weapon that was previously off-limits: the right to dissolve the National Assembly. With a parliament led by Pastef and an executive now backed by its own party, the country is approaching a pivotal date. Here is a breakdown of the calendar, the options on the table, their costs, and what each side stands to gain or lose.

The timing is no accident. Article 87 of the Constitution allows the president to dissolve the National Assembly once the first two years of the legislature have passed. The current Assembly, dominated by Ousmane Sonko’s Pastef, was elected in November 2024 and installed its bureau on December 2, 2024. Therefore, December 2, 2026, marks the first day dissolution becomes legally possible.

The context has shifted dramatically since this fifteenth legislature took office. Following the rupture with Ousmane Sonko’s Pastef on May 22, 2026, the president no longer commands a parliamentary majority. The former prime minister now leads the Assembly, while the president has formed a new government and launched his own party, Kiiraay. Senegal is experiencing an unprecedented form of cohabitation, where the head of state and the parliamentary majority emerged from the same movement but no longer share the same line.

What the president says, and what his allies suggest

Officially, nothing is decided. Speaking in New York, Bassirou Diomaye Faye downplayed speculation, noting that “we are not yet at December 2” and that no date had been set for a dissolution or elections. However, he has never closed the door.

Among his entourage, the tone is far less cautious. In mid-August, Trade Minister Serigne Guèye Diop announced that Senegal was heading toward new legislative elections, accusing majority MPs of “sabotaging” the president’s agenda. He specifically blamed Pastef elected officials for systematically rejecting initiatives from the presidential palace. Between the president’s caution and the eagerness of some ministers, suspense is maintained—and it likely serves the presidential strategy: the threat of dissolution weighs on parliamentary debates long before it becomes reality.

If the president signs the decree in early December, the country would embark on a rapid legislative campaign. The Constitution mandates a vote within sixty to ninety days after dissolution, placing new legislative elections between late January and early March 2027. The 2024 precedent gives a sense of the pace: dissolved on September 12, the Assembly was renewed by November 17.

This timeline, however, collides with another deadline. Prime Minister Ahmadou Al Aminou Lo has announced that territorial elections will be held on January 17, 2027. Two national votes just weeks apart would pose serious logistical and political problems. A possible “coupling” of the two elections, mentioned by some officials, faces legal hurdles. Dissolution could therefore lead to a reshuffling of the local election calendar—a prospect civil society is already watching closely.

The status quo scenario: cohabitation under strain

The other option is to do nothing, at least for now. Dissolution is a right, not an obligation, and the president could let the legislature run its course. But this status quo would come at a price: governing with an Assembly that is no longer aligned. The first test is already here. The revised finance law linked to the IMF agreement was received by the National Assembly on September 18, and Ousmane Sonko has publicly demanded clarifications on the IMF deal and debt treatment. The 2027 budget will follow.

In this scenario, every major bill would become a tug-of-war. The president has already framed the debate by calling on everyone to take responsibility and stating that the people will arbitrate. The status quo would not be peace, but a war of position, with the January territorial elections serving as the first judge.

The financial question is no small detail in a country negotiating with lenders and trying to contain its debt. The 2024 precedent offers a reliable baseline. During the revised finance law vote that year, the finance minister estimated the cost of organizing the early legislative elections of November 17, 2024, at 20 billion CFA francs. Electoral materials alone weigh heavily: with 41 competing lists, the Interior Ministry spent over 11 billion CFA francs on printing ballots and campaign documents. For comparison, the total cost of the March 2024 presidential election was around 14 billion CFA francs.

A new dissolution would therefore require at least 20 billion francs, added to the cost of territorial elections. The debate has already begun within the presidential camp itself, where a Kiiraay departmental official in Kaolack opposes holding the local vote immediately, calling public spending irresponsible given social emergencies.

What Diomaye Faye and Kiiraay stand to gain or lose

For the head of state, a successful dissolution would be the only way to regain a majority and govern without hindrance until the end of his term. That is the whole point of Kiiraay, launched in July to structure his majority durably and prepare for upcoming elections, including the local polls planned for 2027.

The risk, however, is considerable. The party is barely two months old and has never faced the ballot box. A defeat in the legislative elections would leave the president facing an Assembly re-legitimized by the vote—and therefore even more hostile—for the rest of his term. That is what makes the January territorial elections so strategic: they can serve as a barometer before playing the dissolution card, or conversely reveal a weakness that would make it suicidal.

Pastef starts from a dominant position, with 130 of 165 seats won in 2024. In an early election, the party has mathematically almost nothing to gain in seats and much to lose. But the stakes lie elsewhere. A clear victory after the rupture would validate the thesis of its militants, who accuse the president of betraying the project, and would make Ousmane Sonko the true political center of gravity in the country.

Sonko’s party is not mistaken. Just as the president launched Kiiraay, the National Assembly president was leading a national tour dedicated to the campaign to sell PASTEF membership cards. Each camp is preparing for an electoral battle, whether the date is set in January or later.

For the formations crushed in 2024, a recomposition would be a windfall. The division of the former majority opens unprecedented space, and an early election would offer the opposition a chance to regain parliamentary representation worthy of the name. It must nevertheless choose its position against two blocs that both claim the legacy of the 2024 rupture. A tactical alliance with one camp or the other could become the key to the next election.

Ultimately, December 2 does not mark the day of a decision, but the moment when all options become possible. The president can dissolve from that day, wait for the territorial verdict, or keep the threat in reserve as a means of pressure on MPs. Until then, the examination of the revised finance law and the 2027 budget will reveal much about the climate between the two heads of the former tandem. One thing seems certain: 2027 will open under the sign of the ballot box, and that is perhaps where the real arbitration between Diomaye Faye and Ousmane Sonko will play out.