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Seven years after the fire that nearly destroyed Sonara, its management made a sweeping announcement in June 2026, declaring the company’s revival to the world. While the statement was bold, it lacked the expected memorandum of understanding with a financial partner. Instead, officials outlined a Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM) model for infrastructure reconstruction, with no concrete financing secured.

This approach raises a critical question: if seven years after the disaster Sonara is still at this stage, how long will it take to secure a partner willing to sign agreements before seeking bank financing—a common pattern in Cameroon despite being rare elsewhere?

This mirrors the challenges faced in the mining sector, where agreements often stall at the signing stage before financial backers step in.

The SNH and Nathalie Moudiki factor

Timing appears deliberate. Days before the announcement, Cameroon’s private sector praised the SNH for its Kribi refinery project, successfully led by Nathalie Moudiki. This public commendation came just as President Paul Biya was reassessing the performance of his appointees abroad.

Political maneuvering or genuine revival?

The announcement seems designed to create an illusion of progress, particularly as President Biya evaluates the effectiveness of his administration. The mention of a hydrocracker unit—intended to process Cameroonian oil—was puzzling, as this project was already underway before the fire and is now part of the Kribi refinery expansion.

The sabotage of the Kribi refinery project

Recent weeks have seen sharp criticism of the SNH’s Kribi refinery project, with unsubstantiated claims targeting key figures like Nathalie Moudiki. These attacks coincide suspiciously with Sonara’s revival announcement. Meanwhile, SNH officials continue to highlight Sonara’s historical significance.

In 2020, a Russian delegation from Lukoil proposed a reconstruction plan with modern equipment, but the government declined. Officials cited sovereignty concerns to justify rejecting international partners, despite the fact that Africa’s largest private refinery—Nigeria’s Dangote Refinery—operates independently of state control while processing over 60% of the country’s oil output.

Why hasn’t Sonara adopted the SNH gas model for its petroleum operations? Angola’s Lobito refinery is being built by China, Zambia’s Copperbelt refinery also by China, Uganda’s first refinery by Russia, and Congo has similar projects in the pipeline. The question remains: Is Sonara’s revival genuine, or another attempt to mislead?