Macron’s direct challenge to Sahel military regimes signals a new era

President Emmanuel Macron has adopted an uncharacteristically direct tone, characterizing the state of relations between France and the military regimes in the Sahel as a clear reckoning. By stating that Paris was “paid back with ingratitude,” the French head of state unequivocally acknowledged the conclusion of a diplomatic cycle that spanned over a decade. This forthright declaration explicitly targets the ruling juntas in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey – three capitals that have successively communicated to France their decision to terminate bilateral military cooperation.

a presidential declaration solidifies the sahelian rupture

The language employed by the occupant of the Élysée Palace sharply contrasts with the diplomatic prudence typically observed when engaging with African partners. By asserting the significant efforts France undertook, often at a considerable human and financial cost, Emmanuel Macron aims to place the responsibility for this diplomatic breakdown squarely on the transitional authorities that emerged from the coups d’état in 2020, 2022, and 2023. This discourse also serves a domestic audience in France, where the Sahelian chapter is largely perceived as a major strategic setback, particularly since the forced withdrawal of Operation Barkhane in 2022.

Nevertheless, the President’s phrasing risks further exacerbating an already precarious situation. In both Bamako and Niamey, the official narrative has been built upon denouncing a French presence deemed intrusive, even neocolonial. Each statement of grievance emanating from the Élysée inevitably fuels the sovereignist rhetoric championed by figures such as Colonels Assimi Goïta, Ibrahim Traoré, and Abdourahamane Tiani. European chancelleries, closely observing these developments, express concern that such direct language could also complicate their remaining channels of communication with the Sahelian capitals.

the alliance of Sahel states accelerates geopolitical shifts

Since the establishment of the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES) in September 2023, which evolved into a confederation in July 2024, the three military regimes have significantly accelerated their diplomatic reorientation. This includes their withdrawal from the Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO), a closer alignment with Moscow through the Africa Corps (succeeding Wagner), and an opening towards Ankara and Tehran. The geopolitical repositioning of Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey is proceeding at an accelerated pace. France, which once maintained considerable economic influence through entities like the Franc CFA, Orange, TotalEnergies, and Eramet, is now witnessing its leverage diminish.

Concretely, the announced departure of the last French troops from Tchad and Sénégal by late 2024 marks the completion of Paris’s military disengagement from the Sahelo-Saharan front. The French presence in Afrique de l’Ouest, which still comprised over 5,000 personnel in 2020, has now been reduced to a residual footprint primarily focused on training and intelligence. This contraction fundamentally transforms France’s model of influence, which for a long time relied heavily on the projection of military force.

Paris navigates the double-edged sword of its rhetoric

By publicly citing the “ingratitude” of African partners, Emmanuel Macron risks reinforcing a postcolonial interpretation that has already gained significant traction among Sahelian public opinion, particularly within urban and youth demographics. Whether intended or not, the term evokes a paternalistic narrative that the French executive had actively sought to dismantle since the Ouagadougou speech in November 2017. The stark contrast between initial promises of a renewed Franco-African relationship and the current reality of rupture is now undeniable.

Furthermore, this presidential declaration comes at a time when Paris is actively seeking to redefine its African partnerships, focusing on states perceived as more stable, from Maroc to Côte d’Ivoire, including Bénin and Mauritanie. This strategy of bypassing the Sahel necessitates measured public discourse to avoid contaminating the entire spectrum of its relationships. Several African diplomats, even within allied nations, privately express discomfort with what they view as an overly personal register.

In Dakar, Abidjan, and Nouakchott, the unfolding situation is closely monitored, as it highlights France’s difficulty in cleanly concluding one chapter without reopening old wounds. The fundamental question remains: how can Paris restore its credibility as an attentive partner on the continent while simultaneously asserting a Sahelian legacy it believes is unfairly judged?