Captain Ibrahim Traoré, Burkina Faso’s interim president, used a late-September interview on BF1 TV to shut down any prospect of normalising diplomatic ties with France, delivering unusually blunt criticism of Paris. The intervention fits a pattern the regime has followed since seizing power in September 2022: steadily dismantling the old French partnership and steering Burkinabè diplomacy toward new allies, with Russia at the front of the queue.
Since taking office, Traoré has repeatedly attacked France in public, while relations between Ouagadougou and Paris have sunk to their lowest point. The withdrawal of French forces, the departure of diplomats and the questioning of several areas of cooperation have all marked that rupture. At the same time, the Burkinabè authorities have deepened ties with Moscow and consolidated their alignment with Mali and Niger inside the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
Officials present the realignment as a reconquest of national sovereignty. Yet it deserves scrutiny beyond the political messaging. A sovereign state is free to pick its partners, but those choices should preserve its decision-making autonomy, strengthen its national capacities and durably improve the living conditions of its people.
The central question is therefore straightforward: has Burkina Faso genuinely freed itself from outside influence, or has it simply swapped one historic partner for another whose interests do not necessarily coincide with its own?
A break with Paris that does not, on its own, guarantee independence
Rejecting France has become one of the central pillars of Traoré’s political discourse. The stance resonates with part of the population, shaped by a long history of unbalanced relations with the former colonial power and by frustration over the results of past cooperation.
Yet denouncing French influence is not, in itself, a complete sovereignty policy. Breaking with one partner does not automatically mean becoming independent of all outside influence. Genuine sovereignty is also measured by a country’s ability to set its own priorities, diversify its partnerships, negotiate balanced agreements and refuse pressure, whatever its origin.
By presenting the rupture with Paris as major proof of national emancipation, the Burkinabè authorities risk reducing a complex issue to a contest between two foreign powers. France becomes the symbol of past dependency, while Russia is cast as the remedy for that dependency.
That reading deserves nuance. No foreign partner Western, Russian, Chinese or from any other region bases its foreign policy solely on defending a third country’s interests. States pursue their own strategic, economic, military and diplomatic interests first.
Russia is no exception.
Russia: a strategic ally, but not a selfless partner
The rapprochement between Ouagadougou and Moscow is one of the most visible shifts in Burkinabè foreign policy since Traoré came to power. Security cooperation plays a major part in this new orientation, as Burkina Faso confronts persistent insecurity driven by armed terrorist groups.
For the Burkinabè authorities, diversifying military partners can be a way to strengthen national capacities and move away from cooperation deemed insufficient with France. That choice falls within Burkina Faso’s sovereign right.
But the question should not be whether Russia is preferable to France in principle. It should be what Burkina Faso concretely gets from this new relationship.
What are each side’s commitments? What are the financial, military or economic counterparts? How long do the agreements run? What guarantees frame foreign partners’ interventions? And above all, to what extent does this cooperation durably strengthen the Burkinabè army’s own capabilities?
These questions are essential. Military cooperation can deliver operational support, equipment or technical expertise. But it does not automatically guarantee a lasting improvement in security. Its effectiveness must be judged on verifiable results: protection of civilians, securing of roads, the return of displaced people and the ability of public services to function in violence-hit areas.
It would therefore be premature to treat the mere rapprochement with Moscow as proof of strategic success. Conversely, it would be just as excessive to conclude, without examining the agreements and the results, that Russia dictates every decision of the Burkinabè authorities.
The real issue is whether this partnership increases Burkina Faso’s decision-making capacity or creates new forms of dependency.
Changing partners does not necessarily mean changing the dependency system
One paradox of Traoré’s policy lies in how sovereignty is framed in public debate. The authorities say they want to free Burkina Faso from Western influence, but that ambition cannot be assessed solely through declarations against France or rapprochements with Moscow.
Sovereignty is not limited to the choice of military partners. It also concerns control of natural resources, budget policy, economic independence, industrial capacity, food security and the freedom to negotiate with foreign investors.
A country can break with a former partner power while remaining dependent on other actors for military equipment, technology, financing or certain export markets. That dependency is not necessarily submission, since international relations often rest on interdependence. It becomes problematic when alternative options are limited and the country struggles to defend its own priorities.
That is why Burkina Faso should be judged on its ability to genuinely diversify its relations, develop national skills and negotiate transparent partnerships.
If Russia becomes an unavoidable partner in certain fields without the country having credible alternatives, the risk would be the emergence of a new dependency, even if it is packaged in different political rhetoric.
This is not to claim that Moscow controls Traoré’s decisions, since no evidence supports such a conclusion. It is rather to recall an obvious fact of international relations: a foreign partner, however politically close, pursues its own interests and cannot be considered selfless by principle.
The AES: a sovereignty ambition that must also prove itself
The rapprochement between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, grouped within the Alliance of Sahel States, fits this drive to redefine regional power balances. The three countries highlight their sovereignty, their desire to coordinate policies and their ambition to strengthen autonomy vis-à-vis outside partners.
In principle, regional cooperation can be a major lever. It can facilitate pooled defence resources, intelligence coordination, trade and the search for common solutions to Sahel challenges.
But a political alliance does not, on its own, guarantee effective collective action. It must demonstrate its ability to produce concrete results for populations.
On security, persistent attacks, population displacements and difficulties in certain localities demand a rigorous evaluation of the strategies adopted. The situation cannot be assessed solely through official statements or talk of territorial reconquest. It requires verifiable data, comparison over time and particular attention to the situation of civilians.
On the economic front, the ambition of regional integration must also translate into smoother trade, suitable infrastructure and mechanisms to support producers, traders and businesses.
Finally, the sovereignty claimed by the AES should also show itself in its members’ ability to maintain diversified relations with several partners, without turning their opposition to certain powers into the exclusive guiding principle of their diplomacy.
A sovereign alliance is not one that simply switches sides, but one that keeps the freedom to choose, to negotiate and, if necessary, to say no to its own allies.
Political sovereignty cannot overshadow the results people expect
Beyond diplomatic questions, the debate on sovereignty must be placed back in the daily lives of Burkinabè citizens.
For populations facing insecurity, displacement, economic hardship or limited access to certain public services, the essential question remains results.
The break with France may be a deliberate political choice. The rapprochement with Russia may also serve strategic objectives. But these decisions cannot exempt the authorities from accounting for their effectiveness.
People’s safety, continuity of public services, access to healthcare and education, job opportunities and protection of economic activities are all indicators for assessing a government’s action.
It would therefore be insufficient to measure the success of Traoré’s policy by the number of hostile statements toward Paris, symbols of diplomatic rupture or multiplying meetings with Russian officials.
Results must be examined on the ground, using reliable and independent indicators.
Sovereignty cannot be merely a diplomatic posture. It must translate into a greater capacity of the state to protect its citizens, finance its priorities and meet its population’s needs.
The real test: Burkina Faso’s freedom of decision
By rejecting any normalisation with France, Traoré confirms his choice of a lasting political rupture with Paris. But this orientation raises a fundamental question about the very conception of sovereignty defended by his regime.
A genuinely independent country must be able to choose its partners without submitting to their demands, maintain relations with several powers and defend its interests without being trapped by its alliances.
France has its interests. Russia has its own. Other powers also pursue their own objectives. No diplomatic rapprochement should therefore be assessed solely on the basis of ideological proximity between leaders.
Burkina Faso has the right to diversify its partnerships and redefine its strategic priorities. But it is up to its authorities to demonstrate that this realignment produces measurable results and effectively strengthens the country’s autonomy.
The question is not to systematically defend Paris against Moscow, nor to treat Russia as an adversary by principle. It is to know whether the choices made durably serve Burkina Faso’s interests.
For, ultimately, sovereignty is not proclaimed only in speeches against the former colonial power: it is verified in the ability to decide freely, negotiate without constraint and deliver concrete results for one’s people.
And it is precisely on that ground that Traoré’s policy must be assessed, beyond slogans, alliances and diplomatic statements.
By Daniel Mbami — Journaliste / Rédacteur
