Burkina Faso’s political transition: navigating the path to stability

The definition of a coup d’état frequently shifts, often aligning with the perceived interests of the international community and its neighboring states. In this context, the appointment of Transition President Michel Kafando faced scrutiny for being seemingly unconstitutional. For at least twelve months, Burkina Faso was set to operate under a framework of newly established, provisional institutions.

Much like assembling building blocks, the interim institutions of the transition gradually took shape. Following the sudden public emergence of military figures in the wake of President Blaise Compaoré’s swift departure from Kosyam, Ouagadougou appeared to regain a measure of calm.

Seemingly from nowhere, Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida rapidly asserted control, assuming all the prerogatives of a Head of State. His true intentions sparked widespread speculation: how did he manage to integrate himself among the demonstrators and political party leaders? Was his deployment to the Place de la Révolution, perhaps, a pre-arranged strategy between President Blaise Compaoré and General Gilbert Diendéré to maintain influence over power? Initially, an officer from the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) publicly aligning with the populace naturally elicited suspicion and distrust. The initial actions and decisions made by the military, such as suspending the Constitution and dissolving the National Assembly, quickly fueled fears of an impending junta, threatening to strip the people, who had sacrificed and shed blood, of their hard-won victory.

The African Union, true to form, promptly threatened to impose sanctions on Burkina Faso. Simultaneously, ECOWAS heads of state — John Dramani Mahama of Ghana, Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, and Macky Sall of Senegal — converged to engage with the military leadership, urging them to moderate their stance. The precedents set by similar situations involving Captains Daddis Camara in Guinea and Sanogo in Mali undoubtedly prompted Burkinabé officers to exercise caution. They recognized that seizing power by force rarely goes unpunished, and a protracted resolution to the crisis risked isolating the nation, leading to growing unpopularity.

Ultimately, the military negotiated a pragmatic compromise, formalized within the Transition Charter. The agreement stipulated that the executive branch of the transition would be led by a civilian, while the military would retain significant influence over the government. Concurrently, a 90-member legislative body, the National Transition Council (CNT), was established to accommodate those who had spearheaded the struggle. A twenty-member Designation Committee was tasked with the crucial responsibility of naming a Transitional President. This temporary arrangement, effectively a fixed-term contract, was slated to conclude in November 2015, marking the original end of President Blaise Compaoré’s mandate.

For the selection of the Head of State, each vital national component — including the army, civil society, opposition parties, and religious and traditional authorities — was required to submit a shortlist within a specified timeframe. Ultimately, five individuals were chosen for consideration:

The opposition and civil society groups championed two prominent journalists: Newton Ahmed Barry, director of the weekly L’Evènement, and Chériff Sy Moumina, publishing director of the weekly Bendré. Their legitimacy stemmed from their media outlets’ consistent criticism of the former regime. The army, however, presented a more diverse pool of candidates: an esteemed cleric, Archbishop Mgr Ouédraogo of Bobo Dioulasso; a seasoned diplomat, Michel Kafando; and a woman, former minister Joséphine Ouédraogo. Early in the process, Archbishop Ouédraogo, initially a strong contender, declared his disinterest in the position, preferring to continue his ecclesiastical duties.

The remaining two candidates, Joséphine Ouédraogo and Michel Kafando, held a distinct advantage over the others due to their extensive experience within major international institutions. Madame Joséphine Ouédraogo had served with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), while Michel Kafando had twice represented his nation at the UN headquarters in New York, first from 1981 to 1982, and again from 1998 to 2011. In the land of the Upright Man, an unspoken divide often separates those who supported Thomas Sankara from those who opposed him. This implicit ideological split often influenced the trajectory of political figures. Joséphine Ouédraogo had served as Minister of Family Development and Solidarity from 1984 to 1987. Michel Kafando, notably, was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Prime Minister Thomas Sankara, under President Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo, in 1982. However, the two men reportedly had disagreements over the conduct of Upper Volta’s diplomacy and held diametrically opposing ideologies.

A career within an international institution offered a dual benefit: a significant boost to one’s curriculum vitae and an invaluable network of contacts. This proved to be a disadvantage for the two aspiring journalists put forward by the opposition.

For a limited period, Michel Kafando, the retired diplomat, was compelled to set aside his cattle and poultry farming in Saponé for a greater purpose: to safeguard the nation in crisis. He assumed both the Presidency of the Transition and the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. This dual role streamlined diplomatic engagement, offering a single interlocutor for international channels and effectively bypassing the head of government, Isaac Zida.

The unfolding situation in Burkina Faso was closely monitored by several international capitals: Accra, which chaired ECOWAS; Addis Ababa for the African Union; and Paris and Washington for geopolitical considerations. On the day of Michel Kafando’s inauguration, numerous Heads of State from Mauritania (representing the AU), Ghana (representing ECOWAS), Togo, Benin, Mali, and Niger traveled to Ouagadougou, signaling a re-acceptance of Burkina Faso into the international fold. The sheer scale of this representation raised questions: did it implicitly endorse the reinstatement of a constitution that had been suspended just weeks prior? The United States, adhering to its principle of not cooperating with non-democratically elected heads of state, faced a dilemma regarding Burkina Faso. However, the international community ultimately found a way to legitimize the transition, effectively ‘masking’ the coup and re-establishing a semblance of constitutional order. This pragmatic approach ensured that American reconnaissance aircraft could remain stationed in Ouagadougou, as the US relied on Mauritania and Burkina Faso as crucial bases for monitoring the Sahel region.

Out of the 26 ministerial positions, the military secured four crucial portfolios: the Prime Minister also held the Ministry of Defense; Colonel Auguste Denise Barry, a former Minister of Security in 2011, was assigned the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security (MATDS); Colonel David Kabré, spokesperson for Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida, took charge of Sports; and Boubacar Ba assumed the highly strategic Ministry of Mines and Energy. Joséphine Ouédraogo was appointed Keeper of the Seals, a position seen by some as a consolation prize, while Augustin Loada, a university professor and prominent civil society figure, was named to the Public Service. Adama Sagnon, who inherited the Ministry of Culture, had to resign just days after his appointment due to pressure from civil society, which criticized the former prosecutor for having ‘shelved’ the Norbert Zongo case.

The National Transition Council (CNT), the interim legislative body, elected Chériff Sy Moumina, one of the unsuccessful candidates for the transitional presidency, as its president. He secured the position with 71 votes out of 90 from his peers. The immediate task now is to finalize the establishment of institutions and mechanisms that will guide Burkina Faso toward transparent and equitable elections, including the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), a revised electoral code, and necessary organic laws.

What critical missions lie ahead for this abbreviated transitional period?

Since the beginning of December, Michel Kafando has signed the presidential decree establishing the Commission for National Reconciliation and Reforms (CRNR). The scope and duration of this body’s mandate remain key questions. More than 27 years after the assassination of Thomas Sankara, the nation of the Upright Man appears ready to embark on a process of national catharsis. Immediately following his appointment, one of President Michel Kafando’s initial decisions was to authorize investigations to identify Thomas Sankara’s remains. Prime Minister Isaac Zida also played a significant role, announcing that the file on President Thomas Sankara’s assassination would be ‘fully opened,’ and that, if necessary, Burkina Faso would seek the extradition of former President Blaise Compaoré from Morocco.

Through a series of public announcements, the current leaders have opened a Pandora’s Box. Such complex cases typically demand an extended period that will likely exceed the duration of the transition. Were these declarations intended to reassure opponents of the Blaise Compaoré regime? As Minister of Defense, army reform should have been Isaac Zida’s primary focus. In a significant move, General Gilbert Diendéré, who served as Blaise Compaoré’s special chief of staff and was thus Isaac Zida’s direct hierarchical superior, was dismissed from his duties by President Michel Kafando. He was replaced by Commander Théophile Nikièma, a former head of the ‘Operations and Instruction’ Bureau of the RSP and also the director of External Documentation, which functions as the intelligence service of the Kosyam palace.

The question remains whether Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida and Commander Théophile Nikièma will maintain loyalty to General Gilbert Diendéré. Burkina Faso successfully de-escalated the political crisis of October 30th, which led to Blaise Compaoré’s downfall, without major hitches. The intervention of RSP elements during the initial clashes could have easily triggered a civil war. Perhaps it would be more prudent to focus on organizing elections rather than potentially implicating General Gilbert Diendéré and other living civilian and military figures by re-examining the Sankara case.

How can the nation avoid a ‘witch hunt’? Already, two general managers of major national companies, deemed close to the family of the deposed president, have been dismissed: Jean-Baptiste Bérehoundougou from the Société Nationale Burkinabè des Hydrocarbures (SONABHY) and Jean Christophe Ilboudo from the Société Nationale Burkinabè d’Electricité (SONABEL). While an act of contrition does not fully absolve past transgressions, it contributes to reconciliation; this was exemplified by the recent approach of Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo of the Alliance for Democracy and Federation – African Democratic Rally (ADF-RDA), a political party affiliated with the former presidential movement. Similarly, a national tribute was paid to the seven individuals who tragically fell during the events of October 30th and 31st, now laid to rest in the Gounghin cemetery.

Will the CRNR continue its work beyond the conclusion of the transitional period? With all institutions now in place, political figures and parties are set to take center stage. Notably, no major political heavyweights chose to occupy seats within either the Executive or the CNT, effectively precluding them from running in future universal suffrage elections. Presidential candidates are already poised at the starting blocks. The creation of the CNT also prompted the self-dissolution of the CFOP, the opposition coalition. The electoral battle is certainly expected to intensify in early 2015.