The alliance of Sahel states faces hurdles in nigerian security interventions

A year has passed since the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, formalized its charter and established its confederation. Yet, questions frequently arise regarding its capacity to fulfill its core pledge: mutual defense. Amid recent security escalations and significant jihadist assaults impacting Niger’s territory, the absence of a visible joint armed intervention has prompted concerns among local populations and regional observers alike.

Several foundational and strategic elements contribute to this operational inertia on the ground in Niger.

Saturated national defense forces

The primary constraint remains the overwhelming demands placed on each nation’s armed forces. Every member state within the alliance confronts intense security threats within its own borders:

• In Mali: The national army and its allies continue to concentrate efforts on maintaining control over the North and Center, battling the JIM (Permanent Strategic Framework and Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups).
• In Burkina Faso: Over half of the nation’s territory remains under constant pressure from persistent terrorist attacks.
• In Niger: Security forces are tasked with simultaneously securing the critical ‘three borders’ region (Liptako-Gourma) against the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS), while also monitoring the volatile Lake Chad basin.

Given this demanding landscape, none of the three states possess sufficient strategic reserves to deploy a substantial contingent to a neighboring country without critically undermining their own national defense frameworks.

Logistical complexities for a unified force

While the political decision to unify forces was agreed upon during AES Confederation summits, the practical execution of this joint force encounters substantial material realities:

• Interoperability and command: Harmonizing disparate military doctrines and establishing an integrated chain of command demands considerable time and robust, secure communication networks.
• Air support and intelligence: Projecting troops over vast distances across the Sahel mandates significant resources, including armored transport, extensive resupply capabilities, and aerial intelligence (such as drones and combat aircraft). These capacities are currently limited and heavily utilized locally.

The evolving role of external partners

The departure of conventional military forces, notably France and the UN mission MINUSMA, has led the three military regimes to pivot their partnerships towards Russia. This shift is evident in the deployment of the Africa Corps paramilitary group. However, these support forces are primarily deployed under bilateral agreements and are not principally mandated to conduct cross-border operations under the AES banner.

A strategic emphasis on intelligence sharing

Beyond large-scale troop deployments, AES authorities highlight an alternative form of cooperation: intelligence sharing and targeted, punctual border operations. For the Sahelian military command, intervention doesn’t exclusively manifest as a large, visible deployment. Instead, it often involves coordinated operations within the three borders zone, where each national army primarily intervenes from its own sovereign territory to address pressing Niger security concerns.