At Assamaka, on the edge of the Sahara, Algeria and Niger have officially switched on their trans-Saharan fiber optic link. The inauguration has triggered a wave of reactions — from operators and officials to citizens and analysts — and raised a simple question: what comes next for a region still fighting for digital footing? Beyond the cable itself, the launch has opened a public debate about who benefits, who pays, and whether the infrastructure can survive the security threats surrounding it.
Assamaka: more than a border town, a turning point
The location was never incidental.
In Assamaka, in the Agadez region, Algerian and Nigerien telecommunications ministers presided over the official commissioning ceremony of the cross-border fiber optic link between the two countries.
The event marks the culmination of years of construction under the Trans-Saharan Fiber Optic Backbone (DTS), a regional initiative backed by NEPAD and intended to eventually connect Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Mali and Mauritania.
But the financial history of the project deserves scrutiny: contrary to what the phrase “Algeria-Niger deal” might suggest, public documents do not show a single bilateral contract involving, for example, a payment of tens or hundreds of millions of euros from Niamey to Algiers.
The funding picture is far more complex.
The €43 million question: what Niger’s component really covers
According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), Niger’s portion of the Trans-Saharan Backbone amounts to roughly €43 million.
That envelope finances 1,031 kilometers of fiber optic cable across five major routes, a national Tier III data center and an 88-kilometer local loop.
Figures released by Nigerien authorities go further. In March 2026, the project coordinator cited overall funding exceeding 30 billion CFA francs, including about 16 billion CFA francs in credit, 12.76 billion CFA francs in grants and 2.17 billion CFA francs in national counterpart funding.
One key clarification is essential: the €43 million corresponds to Niger’s component of the project, not a sum paid by Niger to Algeria to purchase the link.
AfDB documentation on the multinational project approved in 2016 reveals a financial architecture blending the African Development Fund, European co-financing and state contributions. The original multinational project was valued at 62.262 million units of account.
In other words, no public document supports the claim that Algeria “earns” X billion and Niger Y billion from the inauguration.
And that is precisely where the economic story begins.
What Niger stands to gain — and what remains unknown
The primary beneficiary is unquestionably Niger.
As a landlocked country, Niger depends on international connections routed through neighboring states’ infrastructure. The new backbone gives it an additional route to the global internet, notably via Algeria.
The benefit isn’t just the fiber itself — it’s access to international capacity.
Algeria holds significant international bandwidth capacity through its submarine cables. Algerian authorities have said for years they want to use that capacity to connect landlocked Sahelian nations.
For Niamey, that potentially means:
- greater internet capacity;
- better quality of service;
- reduced dependency on certain existing routes;
- more competition among capacity providers;
- new possibilities for digital public services;
- growth in e-commerce and mobile financial services;
- stronger connectivity for northern regions.
The project should also connect Niger more closely not only to Algeria but also to Nigeria, Benin, Burkina Faso and Chad.
The economic promise is substantial. But the exact savings for the Nigerien state or the additional annual revenue it will collect has not been published at this stage.
That is an essential point to underline in any serious analysis.
Algeria’s calculus: more than telecom revenue
This is where the file turns geopolitical.
Algeria didn’t just build infrastructure that stops at its border. For years it has sought to make its territory a digital gateway to the Sahel.
Algiers claims to have completed roughly 2,548 kilometers of fiber optic cable between Algiers and In Guezzam, on the Nigerien border. In 2024, the Algerian ministry even cited about 2,600 kilometers completed.
The logic is straightforward: route Sahelian digital traffic up to Algerian international infrastructure.
For Algeria, that potentially opens a data transit market.
The more Niger — and tomorrow other Sahelian countries — uses Algerian international capacity, the more Algiers’ position as a regional digital hub strengthens.
There is already a concrete sign of this strategy.
In September 2026, Algérie Télécom signed an agreement with Niger Télécom providing for a donation of transmission equipment enabling a link between In Guezzam and Agadez, with an initial announced capacity of 100 gigabits.
That detail is telling: Algiers is no longer content with building its part of the backbone. It also seeks to support the operation and strengthening of Nigerien infrastructure.
The return sought is therefore not necessarily an immediate financial one. It can be commercial, technological, diplomatic and strategic.
The Algerian bet: becoming the Sahel’s digital gateway
Algiers’ calculation goes far beyond telecommunications.
The Algerian government officially presents the Trans-Saharan Backbone as a way to make Algeria a regional connectivity hub and offers landlocked Sahelian countries access to its international capacities linked to submarine cables.
This strategy comes amid Algeria’s repositioning in the Sahel.
In March 2026, Algiers and Niamey reaffirmed the strategic nature of their partnership, giving particular priority to security coordination and infrastructure projects linking the two countries: the trans-Saharan road, fiber optic cable and trans-Saharan gas pipeline.
The cable is thus one piece of a much larger puzzle.
For Algiers, strengthening economic and digital ties with Niamey helps consolidate influence in a region where other powers — Russia, Turkey, Gulf states, China and Western actors — are also seeking to expand their presence.
Fiber thus becomes an instrument of soft power — and of economic sovereignty.
The paradox: strategic infrastructure in a high-risk zone
One question official ceremonies naturally downplay: who will protect the fiber?
The route crosses parts of Niger where security risks are far from theoretical.
The Agadez region is a strategic area for Niger. Assamaka, on the Algerian border, has seen a reinforced military presence. In March 2026, the commander of defense zone No. 2 traveled there to meet forces deployed in what is considered a strategic zone.
Recent history also reminds us of this border’s vulnerability: in June 2021, a joint police and national guard patrol was attacked near Assamaka, leaving four dead.
But the problem extends well beyond the country’s north.
In 2026, Niger faces growing pressure from two major jihadist organizations: the Islamic State in the Sahel (ISSP) and JNIM, affiliated with Al-Qaeda. ACLED has described western Niger as a major theater of confrontation between the two.
In June 2026, an attack claimed by JNIM against Niamey’s airport and military base further demonstrated armed groups’ ability to strike sensitive infrastructure, including in the capital.
The risk to the fiber is twofold: sabotage and accidental or deliberate network interruption, but also the difficulty of maintaining infrastructure spanning long desert distances.
Fiber as a sovereignty asset
This is probably one of the most underestimated stakes.
The Backbone doesn’t just carry streaming, messaging or social media. It can support administrative communications, financial services, trade exchanges, data systems and digitized public services.
Niger plans to pair the fiber with a national Tier III data center designed to strengthen its digital sovereignty.
The more the country digitizes its administration and economy, the more critical this infrastructure becomes.
That means it will have to be protected like a road, a pipeline or a power line.
And this necessity paradoxically gives new dimension to security cooperation between Algiers and Niamey. The two countries decided in February 2026 to strengthen border control and coordinate their strategies against terrorism and cross-border crime.
A new route, but not yet a windfall
The big economic question remains open.
How much will Algeria earn each year from Nigerien traffic? How much will Niger save on connectivity costs? What will be the price of transiting a gigabit through the Algerian link? What share will go to public operators?
For now, available public data cannot answer these questions precisely.
What can be established, however, is far more solid: Niger benefited from an investment of about €43 million for its national component, largely financed by the AfDB and supplemented by a national contribution; Algeria has built several thousand kilometers of fiber on its own territory; and the two countries have now turned these two national networks into an operational cross-border digital corridor.
The real “deal” is therefore less a check than an architecture.
For Niamey, it’s a partial exit from digital isolation. For Algiers, it’s the chance to become a privileged digital gateway to the Sahel.
But in a space where armed groups still contest states’ territorial control, one final condition will determine the success of this ambition: that the cable remains intact.
Because in the Sahara, building fiber is a technical feat. Turning it into profitable, secure and sustainable infrastructure could be the real challenge of the next decade.
